This paper explores archival material concerning the reception of Leonard J. Savage’s foundational work of rational choice theory in its subjective-Bayesian form. The focus is on the criticism raised in the early 1960s by Daniel Ellsberg, William Fellner, and Cedric Smith, who were supporters of the newly developed subjective approach but could not understand Savage’s insistence on the strict version he shared with Bruno de Finetti. The episode is well known, thanks to the so-called Ellsberg Paradox and the extensive reference made to it in current decision theory. But Savage’s reaction to his critics has never been examined. Although Savage never really engaged with the issue in his published writings, the private exchange with Ellsberg and Fellner, and with de Finetti about how to deal with Smith, shows that Savage’s attention to the generalization advocated by his correspondents was substantive. In particular, Savage’s defense of the normative value of rational choice theory against counterexamples such as Ellsberg’s did not prevent him from admitting that he would give careful consideration to a more realistic axiomatic system, should the critics be able to provide one.

中文翻译：

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伦纳德·萨维奇、埃尔斯伯格悖论和关于主观概率的辩论：来自档案的证据

本文探讨了有关接受 Leonard J. Savage 的主观贝叶斯形式的理性选择理论基础著作的档案材料。重点是丹尼尔·埃尔斯伯格、威廉·费尔纳和塞德里克·史密斯在 1960 年代初期提出的批评，他们是新发展的主观方法的支持者，但无法理解萨维奇坚持他与布鲁诺·德·菲内蒂分享的严格版本。由于所谓的埃尔斯伯格悖论以及当前决策理论中对它的广泛引用，这一事件众所周知。但从未审查过萨维奇对批评者的反应。尽管萨维奇在他出版的著作中从未真正参与过这个问题，与埃尔斯伯格和费尔纳的私人交流，以及与德菲内蒂关于如何处理史密斯的交流，表明萨维奇对他的通讯员所倡导的概括的关注是实质性的。特别是，萨维奇对理性选择理论的规范性价值的辩护并没有阻止他承认，如果批评者能够提供一个更现实的公理系统，他会认真考虑。