Supply chain members’ reciprocal altruism and consumers’ quality and service reference effects are important behavioral factors that affect the decision-making of supply chain members. This article incorporates these factors into a product–service supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in the online-to-offline (O2O) environment. Based on the inherent dynamics of the model, we construct a differential game model between the manufacturer and the retailer. Based on the Bellman continuous dynamic programming theory, this study analyzes the quality strategy of the manufacturer, the service level strategy of the retailer, and the performance of the supply chain system under three decision-making patterns (decentralization, centralization, and reciprocal altruism) within the O2O framework. The results show that compared with the decentralized decision-making model, reciprocal altruism helps members develop higher quality and service levels, improve brand goodwill, and obtain greater utility. The results are verified by numerical examples, and sensitivity analysis of consumer quality and the service reference effect, channel preference, and members’ reciprocal altruism behavior on the supply chain performance is carried out. The results show: (1) Consumers’ reference effects cause an “anchoring mentality” among consumers, which leads the manufacturer to lower the quality level and the retailer to lower the service level. This hurts the performance of the product–service supply chain. Consumers’ channel preference has an important impact on supply chain members’ strategies and performance. (2) Retailers should encourage consumers to purchase products online and use offline channel services as sales assistance measures to satisfy consumers’ experience utility. (3) As a positive social preference, the supply chain performance under the members’ reciprocal altruism decision-making model is Pareto-improved and receives additional social benefits. (4) Only when the manufacturer and the retailer have pure altruistic preference, that is, minimum return and maximum altruism, the total profit of the supply chain can reach that of the centralized decision-making scenario.

供应链成员的相互利他主义以及消费者的质量和服务参考效应是影响供应链成员决策的重要行为因素。本文将这些因素纳入了在线到离线（O2O）环境中的由制造商和零售商组成的产品服务供应链中。基于模型的内在动力学，我们在制造商和零售商之间构建了一个差分博弈模型。基于贝尔曼连续动态规划理论，本研究分析了制造商的质量策略，零售商的服务水平策略以及在三种决策模式（去中心化，集中化和互利互惠）下的供应链系统的绩效。在O2O框架中。结果表明，与分散决策模型相比，互惠利他主义可以帮助会员发展更高的质量和服务水平，提高品牌商誉并获得更大的效用。通过数值算例对结果进行了验证，并对消费者质量和服务参考效果，渠道偏好以及成员对供应链绩效的相互利他行为进行敏感性分析。结果表明：（1）消费者的参考效应在消费者中引起了一种“锚定心态”，导致制造商降低质量水平，零售商降低服务水平。这损害了产品服务供应链的绩效。消费者的渠道偏好对供应链成员的策略和绩效有重要影响。（2）零售商应鼓励消费者在线购买产品并使用线下渠道服务作为销售辅助手段，以满足消费者的体验效用。（3）作为一种积极的社会偏好，成员的互惠利他主义决策模型下的供应链绩效得到帕累托改进，并获得了额外的社会效益。（4）只有当制造商和零售商具有纯利他主义的偏好时，即最小收益和最大利他主义，供应链的总利润才能达到集中决策的情形。成员的相互利他主义决策模型下的供应链绩效得到帕累托改进，并获得了额外的社会效益。（4）只有当制造商和零售商具有纯利他主义的偏好时，即最小收益和最大利他主义，供应链的总利润才能达到集中决策的情形。成员的相互利他主义决策模型下的供应链绩效得到帕累托改进，并获得了额外的社会效益。（4）只有当制造商和零售商具有纯利他主义的偏好时，即最小收益和最大利他主义，供应链的总利润才能达到集中决策的情形。