I approach the idea of empirical turns and transcendental theories indirectly. I do not start “post-“ or “neg-” anything; instead I begin pre-philosophically—that is, before everyone has a position and opposes other positions—with Heidegger’s “preparatory hermeneutical” question: As whom and with what concerns do empirically or transcendentally minded philosophers of technology respond to their experience of technoscientific life? For example, in his second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche identifies his concern as one of “taking advantage” of historical knowledge “for life,” that is, he understands himself to be motivated by a life-driven, not scientific “need.” But how are “needs” in Nietzsche’s sense to be distinguished? The question leads straight to Heidegger’s idea of a hermeneutics that comes “before philosophy”—a “hermeneutics of facticity” that considers “what goes on in [i.e., motivates] a philosophy before it becomes what it is”? I argue that once Nietzsche’s notion of need is expanded and deepened in Heidegger’s direction, we gain some clarity about how to appropriate any information “for life,” whether it is science-based, culturally operative, or phenomenological. I then consider Ihde, Stiegler, and the future prospects of empirical turns and transcendental theories in light of this idea.

我间接地探讨了经验转向和先验理论的思想。我不会开始任何“后”或“否”的事情；取而代之的是，我以哲学前的立场开始-也就是说，在每个人都有立场并反对其他立场之前-以海德格尔的“预备的解释学”问题开始：作为经验论者或超然思维的技术哲学家对谁以及他们所关注的那些问题作出回应，以回应他们对技术科学生活的体验？例如，在他第二次不合时宜的冥想中尼采认为他的关注是“终身”利用历史知识的一种方式，也就是说，他了解自己是由生命驱动的而不是科学的“需求”所激发的。但是，如何区分尼采的“需求”呢？这个问题直接导致海德格尔关于“在哲学之前”的诠释学的思想-一种“事实性的诠释学”，它认为“在哲学变成真相之前，它会发生什么（即激发）”？我认为，一旦尼采的需求观念在海德格尔的方向上得到扩展和深化，我们就会对如何适当地适应任何需求有了一些清晰的认识。“终身”的信息，无论是基于科学，文化实践还是现象学的信息。然后，根据这个想法，我将考虑艾德（Ihde），斯蒂格勒（Stiegler）以及经验转向和先验理论的未来前景。