Scholars typically distinguish at least two different Epicurean conceptions of truth: (1) an account that pertains to the truth of perceptions or impressions and (2) an account that pertains to the truth of opinions. This paper addresses the relationship between the truth of perceptions (and by extension: preconceptions and feelings), on the one hand, and the truth of opinions, on the other. It offers an account of what these determinations of truth amount to and how they interact with each other. In doing so, the paper rejects a propositional understanding of Epicurean truth. It instead argues that the Epicurean conception of truth can be explained by relying on images and their combination.

学者们通常至少区分两种不同的伊壁鸠鲁人关于真理的概念：（1）与观念或印象的真理有关的叙述；（2）与观点的真理有关的叙述。本文一方面探讨了观念的真理（并扩展为：先入为主的观念和感觉）与另一方面的观念的真理之间的关系。它说明了这些对真理的确定意味着什么以及它们如何相互影响。这样做，本文拒绝了对伊壁鸠鲁真理的命题理解。相反，它认为伊壁鸠鲁的真理观可以通过依靠图像及其组合来解释。