Financial scandals such as the Enron-Andersen debacle provoke concerns that auditors lack independence when faced with influential clients. Unlike previous studies that examine whether client influence affects audit quality on ongoing engagements (providing mixed results), we investigate whether client influence (which engenders “independence risk”) at the audit-office level affects auditor resignations from high engagement-risk clients. We construct summary measures of engagement risk, using client disclosures on Form 8-K filings, potential risk factors (e.g., litigation risk), and auditor action (e.g., issuance of a going concern opinion) on the previous year’s financial statements. Focusing on risky clients, we find that auditors are more likely on average to resign from influential clients, and this positive association holds for auditors that are less likely to have mechanisms in place to mitigate independence risk. Also, importantly, influential clients are prevalent across the spectrum of client size, and the positive association between client influence and auditor resignations holds for both large and small clients.

诸如安然-安德森 (Enron-Andersen) 破产之类的金融丑闻引发了人们的担忧，即审计师在面对有影响力的客户时缺乏独立性。与之前研究客户影响是否影响正在进行的业务的审计质量（提供混合结果）不同，我们调查审计办公室层面的客户影响（产生“独立风险”）是否影响审计师从高业务风险客户辞职。我们使用客户在 8-K 表格文件中披露的信息、潜在风险因素（例如诉讼风险）和审计师行动（例如，发布持续经营意见）对上一年的财务报表构建业务风险的摘要衡量标准。专注于风险客户，我们发现审计师更多平均而言，可能会从有影响力的客户那里辞职，这种积极的关联适用于不太可能有机制来降低独立性风险的审计师。此外，重要的是，有影响力的客户在各个客户规模范围内都很普遍，客户影响力与审计师辞职之间的正相关关系对大客户和小客户都适用。