ABSTRACT

According to the new dispositionalist’s response to the Frankfurt cases, Jones can do otherwise. Black merely masks (or finks) that ability, but does not deprive Jones of it. This suggestion stands in the tradition of a line of thought according to which an informed view of the truth conditions of ability attributions allows for a compatibilist stance. The promise is that once we understand how abilities work, it turns out that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with determinism, or with Black standing ready to intervene, or indeed both, as the new dispositionalists hold. I argue that this is mistaken. Understanding how abilities work gives us no reason to think that the ability to do otherwise relevant for free will is compatible with either Black’s presence or determinism.

摘要

根据新的倾向主义者对法兰克福案件的回应，琼斯可以做其他事情。黑方只是掩盖（或阻止）该能力，但并未剥夺琼斯的能力。这个建议代表了一种思路的传统，根据这种思路，对能力归因的真实条件的知情观点允许兼容主义立场。承诺是，一旦我们了解能力如何运作，事实证明，做其他事情的能力与决定论相容，或者与布莱克准备干预，或者两者兼而有之，正如新的倾向主义者所持有的那样。我认为这是错误的。理解能力是如何发挥作用的，我们没有理由认为与自由意志相关的能力与布莱克的存在或决定论相容。