Diversionary theories of interstate conflict suggest that domestic problems push leaders to initiate hostilities against foreign foes in order to garner support. However, the empirical support for this proposition is mixed as critics point out that leaders should not start conflicts that can be extremely costly for them, potentially even removing them from office. We propose that while leaders may not initiate new conflicts, they do tap into existing territorial disputes when facing internal disapproval. That is, they engage in material acts of foreign policy showing domestic audiences that they defend or emphasize their country's claim while being unlikely to result in full-scale armed confrontations. To test this claim, we use monthly data, covering the period 2013–2020, on leader approval and incursions into contested airspace from Turkey's long-standing territorial dispute with Greece. Results from time-series models offer support for our expectation.

中文翻译：

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转移性政治和领土争端：来自土耳其领空入侵的证据

国家间冲突的转移理论表明，国内问题促使领导人对外国敌人发起敌对行动，以获得支持。然而，对这一主张的实证支持参差不齐，因为批评者指出，领导者不应引发对他们来说代价极高的冲突，甚至可能将他们免职。我们建议，虽然领导人可能不会发起新的冲突，但在面临内部反对时，他们确实会利用现有的领土争端。也就是说，他们从事实质性的外交政策行为，向国内观众表明他们捍卫或强调自己国家的主张，但不太可能导致全面的武装对抗。为了验证这一说法，我们使用了涵盖 2013-2020 年期间的月度数据，土耳其与希腊长期存在的领土争端导致领导人批准和侵入有争议的领空。时间序列模型的结果支持我们的预期。