I outline a theory of moral motivation which is compatible with the metaphysical claims of strong emotionism—a sentimentalist account of morality first outlined by Jesse Prinz (The emotional construction of morals, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) and supported by myself (Bartlett in Axiomathes, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09524-5) which construes moral concepts and properties as a subset of emotion-dispositional properties. Given these claims, it follows that sincere moral judgements are necessarily motivating in virtue of their emotional constitution. I defend an indefeasible version of judgement motivational internalism which takes into consideration both positively and negatively valenced affective states and how they promote both approach and avoidance motivation, respectively. On this view, in making sincere moral judgements agents are antecedently motivated by standing Desires to avoid or approach the stimuli picked out by their judgements. I also defend internalism against the objections from defeating circumstances and amoralists. As regards the former, I claim that the tendency of philosophers to frame the motivation debate in terms of positive moral judgements makes the argument from defeating circumstances appear more plausible than it is; as regards the latter, I claim the amoralist argument only has force if it is empirically well supported and that psychological data has hitherto been unconvincing.

我概述了一种道德动机理论，该理论与强烈情感主义的形而上学主张是相容的-一种道德感性主义的叙述，最早由杰西·普林兹（Jesse Prinz）提出（道德的情感建构，牛津大学出版社，牛津，2007年），并得到我自己的支持（巴特利特（Bartlett）） Axiomathes，2020年。https：//doi.org/10.1007/s10516-020-09524-5）将道德概念和特性解释为情感倾向特性的子集。鉴于这些主张，随之而来的是，真诚的道德判断必然会因其情感构成而受到激励。我捍卫了判断动机内在主义的永不止息的版本，它既考虑了积极和消极的情感状态，又考虑了它们如何促进方法和回避动机分别。根据这种观点，在做出真诚的道德判断时，行为人通常是先天的欲望驱使他们避免或接近他们的判断所挑出的刺激。我还捍卫内在主义，以免因击败环境和非道德主义者而遭到反对。关于前者，我主张哲学家倾向于以积极的道德判断来构筑动机辩论的倾向，使得战胜环境的论点显得更加合理。关于后者，我认为只有在经验上得到充分支持并且心理数据迄今尚无说服力时，非种族主义者的论点才有力。