In this paper, we consider a supply chain with a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer sells his digital goods, which may be pirated, to customers through a traditional and a digital retail channel. It is assumed that the manufacturer takes a leader role and the retailers follow it. We investigate the contracts that the manufacturer offers to the retailers and our goal is to find the optimal pricing and ordering decisions made by retailers and the best contract that includes maximum profit for the supply chain. Also, we study a numerical example and examine the proposed contracts. On the other hand, in the sensitivity analysis section, we analyze the impact of each parameter of the problem, in particular, the impact of piracy on the profit of supply chain members and decision variables.

在本文中，我们考虑了具有单个制造商和两个竞争零售商的供应链。制造商通过传统的数字零售渠道将其可能被盗版的数字商品出售给客户。假定制造商担当领导角色，而零售商则跟随它。我们调查制造商提供给零售商的合同，我们的目标是找到零售商做出的最佳定价和订购决策，以及包括供应链最大利润的最佳合同。此外，我们研究了一个数值示例并研究了拟议的合同。另一方面，在敏感性分析部分，我们分析了问题的每个参数的影响，尤其是盗版对供应链成员的利润和决策变量的影响。