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A house divided: Legislative competition and young firm survival in the United States
Strategic Management Journal ( IF 7.815 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-09 , DOI: 10.1002/smj.3283
Manav Raj 1
Affiliation  

Features of the institutional environment influence the performance of firms. In this research, I examine how one aspect of the institutional environment, competition between parties within legislatures, relates to young firm mortality. I argue that higher legislative competition provides legislators with more power to reward favored interests and thus contributes to a competitive environment that benefits well-connected incumbents and imposes negative consequences on young firms. Using data on state legislature composition in the United States and both an ordinary least squares and instrumental variables empirical strategy, I find that legislative competition has a positive relationship with young firm mortality and this relationship is partially mediated by incentives that favor incumbents. In doing so, I highlight that political competition can have negative consequences for some firms.

中文翻译:

分裂的房子:立法竞争与年轻企业在美国的生存

制度环境的特征会影响企业的绩效。在这项研究中,我研究了制度环境的一个方面,即立法机关内部政党之间的竞争,与年轻企业的死亡率有何关系。我认为,更高的立法竞争为立法者提供了更多的权力来奖励有利的利益,从而有助于营造一个有利于关系密切的在职者的竞争环境,并对年轻的公司产生负面影响。使用美国州立法机构构成的数据以及普通最小二乘法和工具变量经验策略,我发现立法竞争与年轻公司死亡率呈正相关,并且这种关系部分是由有利于现任者的激励机制调节的。在这样做,
更新日期:2021-04-09
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