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Reciprocal lending relationships in shadow banking
Journal of Financial Economics ( IF 8.238 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-09 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.04.004
Yi Li

Postcrisis regulations apply stricter liquidity rules to both money market funds (MMFs) and banks, requiring MMFs to do more overnight lending and banks to borrow longer-term. MMFs and banks resolve this dilemma by developing a “bundling” strategy across overnight and longer term markets. In particular, MMFs increase longer term funding and charge a lower rate to banks that have recently accommodated MMFs’ overnight depositing needs. Such cross-market reciprocity is stronger between MMFs and foreign banks, which depend on MMFs for dollar funding more than U.S. banks do. MMFs with lower liquidity buffers and higher flow volatility are more likely to engage in bundling.



中文翻译:

影子银行中的互惠贷款关系

危机后监管对货币市场基金 (MMF) 和银行均适用更严格的流动性规则,要求货币市场基金 (MMF) 提供更多隔夜贷款,而银行则需要长期借款。MMF 和银行通过制定跨隔夜和长期市场的“捆绑”策略解决了这一困境。特别是,货币基金增加了长期资金,并对最近满足货币基金隔夜存款需求的银行收取较低的利率。MMF 与外国银行之间的这种跨市场互惠性更强,外国银行比美国银行更依赖 MMF 提供美元融资。具有较低流动性缓冲和较高流动波动性的 MMF 更有可能进行捆绑销售。

更新日期:2021-06-14
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