We consider a market where “standard” risk-neutral agents coexist with “goal-oriented” agents who, in addition to the expected income, seek a high-enough monetary payoff (the “trigger”) to fulfill a goal. We analyze a two-sided one-to-one matching model where the matching between principals and agents and incentive contracts are endogenous. In any equilibrium contract, goal-oriented agents are matched with the principals with best projects and receive the trigger with positive probability. Moreover, goal and monetary incentives are complementary: goal-oriented agents receive stronger monetary incentives. Finally, we discuss policy interventions in relevant environments.

我们考虑的市场中，“标准” 风险中性代理商与“目标客户”代理商并存，这些 代理商除了预期收入外，还寻求足够高的货币收益（“触发”）来实现目标。我们分析了双向一对一的匹配模型，其中委托人和代理人之间的匹配以及激励合同是内生的。在任何均衡合同中，面向目标的代理人都会与具有最佳项目的委托人匹配，并以正概率接收触发因素。此外，目标和金钱激励是相辅相成的：以目标为导向的代理商会获得更强的金钱激励。最后，我们讨论了相关环境中的政策干预措施。