This paper addresses coordination of pricing and cooperative advertising policies in a two-echelon supply chain under fuzziness of demand function’s parameters and manufacturing costs. Three different decentralized scenarios are introduced with regard to the players’ market power: (1) manufacturer-Stackelberg game where the manufacturer has the dominant power in the channel, (2) retailer-Stackelberg game where the manufacturer follows the strategies taken by a dominant retailer, and (3) Nash game where the manufacture and the retailer with the same market power make the decisions simultaneously. The equilibrium wholesale and retail prices, national and local advertising expenditures, and participation rate are determined using the concepts of possibilistic game theory, and the results are compared with the centralized channel scenario. A numerical example is presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed modeling approach, and sensitivity analyses are carried out to measure the impact of the demand function’s parameters as well as the levels of uncertainty.

本文讨论了需求函数参数和制造成本模糊不清的两级供应链中的定价和合作广告政策的协调。针对玩家的市场力量，引入了三种不同的分散方案：（1）制造商-Stackelberg游戏，其中制造商在渠道中具有主导力量；（2）零售商-Stackelberg游戏，制造商遵循主导者采取的策略（3）Nash游戏，其中制造商和零售商具有相同的市场力量同时做出决策。使用可能性博弈的概念确定均衡的批发和零售价格，国家和地方的广告支出以及参与率，并将结果与​​集中式渠道方案进行比较。