ABSTRACT

This paper maintains that objectivism about practical reasons should be combined with pluralism both about the nature of practical reasons and about action explanations. We argue for an ‘expanding circle of practical reasons’, starting out from an open-minded monist objectivism. On this view, practical reasons are not limited to actual facts, but consist in states of affairs, possible facts that may or may not obtain. Going beyond such ‘that-ish’ reasons, we argue that goals are also bona fide practical reasons. This makes for a genuine pluralism about practical reasons. Furthermore, the facts or states of affairs that function as practical reasons are not exclusively natural or descriptive, but include normative facts. That normative facts can be reasons justifies a pluralism about reason explanations, one which allows for what we call enkratic explanations in addition to teleological ones.

摘要

本文认为，关于实践原因的客观主义应该与关于实践原因的性质和行动解释的多元主义相结合。我们主张从思想开放的一元论客观主义开始“扩大实际原因的圈子”。在这种观点下，实践理由并不限于实际事实，而是在于事态，可能获得也可能无法获得的可能事实。超越这种“那般”的原因，我们认为目标也是真正的实际原因。这使得关于实际原因的真正多元化。此外，作为实践理由的事实或事态不仅是自然的或描述性的，还包括规范性事实。规范性事实可以作为理由证明多元化原因解释，除了目的论解释外，还允许我们称之为灵能解释。