This paper demonstrates the vulnerability of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger to compromised random number generator(s) even if these random numbers are used solely to generate the noises emulating the Johnson noise of Alice’s and Bob’s resistors. The attacks shown are deterministic in the sense that Eve’s knowledge of Alice’s and/or Bob’s random numbers is basically deterministic. Moreover, no statistical evaluation is needed, except for rarely occurring events of negligible, random waiting time and verification time. We explore two situations. In the first case, Eve knows both Alice’s and Bob’s random noises. We show that, in this situation, Eve can quickly crack the secure key bit by using Ohm’s Law. In the other situation, Eve knows only Bob’s random noise. Then Eve first can learn Bob’s resistance value by using Ohm’s Law. Therefore, she will have the same knowledge as Bob, thus at the end of the bit exchange period, she will know Alice’s bit.

中文翻译：

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针对 Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise 安全密钥交换协议的确定性随机数生成器攻击

本文展示了 Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) 安全密钥交换器对受损随机数生成器的脆弱性，即使这些随机数仅用于生成模拟 Alice 和 Bob 电阻器的约翰逊噪声的噪声。显示的攻击是确定性的，因为 Eve 对 Alice 和/或 Bob 的随机数的了解基本上是确定性的。此外，不需要统计评估，除了很少发生的可忽略不计的事件，随机等待时间和验证时间。我们探讨两种情况。在第一种情况下，Eve 知道 Alice 和 Bob 的随机噪声。我们表明，在这种情况下，Eve 可以使用欧姆定律快速破解安全密钥位。在另一种情况下，Eve 只知道 Bob 的随机噪声。然后 Eve 首先可以通过使用欧姆定律了解 Bob 的电阻值。因此，她将拥有与 Bob 相同的知识，因此在比特交换期结束时，她将知道 Alice 的比特。