This paper engages Alex Dubilet’s The Self-Emptying Subject: Kenosis and Immanence, Medieval to Modern and his account of immanence and kenosis as exhibited in his reading of Hegel’s concept of Entäußerung [externalization]. Specifically, I focus on the “problematic of desubjectivation” that centers Dubilet’s critique of transcendence and its relationship to subjection and subjectivity. I reconsider the relationship made between this problematic, the ethics of kenosis, and the concept of immanence so as to demonstrate the ways in which Dubilet attempts to depart from transcendence, subjectivity, and their concomitant ethics. In particular, I consider his reading of Hegel’s concept of Entäußerung and its similarities to the Young Hegelians’ understanding of this concept. My reading of Dubilet suggests that while he seeks to depart from transcendence, he reintroduces transcendence through the “problematic of desubjectivation” and its relationship to kenosis. In conclusion, I question the philosophical import of immanence in contemporary critical inquiry and why its conceptualization is often positioned in opposition to transcendence.

本文涉及亚历克斯·杜比莱特（Alex Dubilet）的《自给自足的主题：Kenosis和Immanence，中世纪到现代》，以及他对Hegel的Entäußerung [externalization]概念的解读中所显示的对内在和Kenosis的阐述。具体来说，我专注于“反主观化问题”，该问题以杜比莱特的超越批判及其与主观和主观性的关系为中心。我重新考虑了这个有问题的，残酷的伦理学和内在性概念之间的关系，以证明杜比莱特试图脱离超越性，主观性和随之而来的伦理学的方式。特别是，我认为他读了黑格尔的《Entäußerung》概念。并与年轻的黑格尔人对该概念的理解相似。我对杜比勒（Dubilet）的阅读表明，在他寻求超越超越的同时，他通过“反主体化的问题”及其与酮症的关系重新介绍了超越。总而言之，我质疑内在性在当代批判性探究中的哲学意义，以及为什么内在性在概念上常常被置于与超越的对立之中。