Brahmānanda Sarasvatī has written an elaborate comment on the following inference cited in Advaitasiddhi: attribute etc. are identical to and different from attributee etc. since they are co-referential. There he wants to prove that every significant case of attribution (such as ‘x [is] y’) is a case of identity that coexists with a difference between two demarcators (upalakṣaṇa). The identity that coexists with difference is called ‘equality’ (tādātmya). This paper will argue that in each case of equality, the realist ontology chooses either identity over difference or the reverse. In the case of ‘the black pot’, the realist ontology prefers difference over identity. In the case of ‘the qualified object is the mere object’, the same ontology prefers identity over difference. Accordingly the ontological ‘entity’ gets projected. This is perhaps because the realist ontology is guided by Ockham’s razor and the grammatical classification of objects.

布拉玛南达·萨拉斯瓦蒂（BrahmannanSarasvatī）对Advaitasiddhi中引用的以下推论进行了详尽的评论：属性等与属性等相同，并且与属性等相同，因为它们是共同引用。他在那里想证明，每个重要的归属案例（例如“ x [is] y”）都是一个身份案例，并且两个分界符之间存在差异（upalakṣaa）。与差异并存的身份被称为“平等”（tādātmya）。本文将论证，在每种平等情况下，现实主义本体论要么选择身份，要么选择差异，要么选择差异。在“黑锅”的情况下，现实主义者倾向于差异而不是身份。在“合格的对象是单纯的对象”的情况下，同一本体优先于同一性而不是差异。因此，本体论的“实体”得到了投射。这也许是因为现实主义本体论是由奥康姆的剃刀和对象的语法分类指导的。