Empirical neuroethics models have always had normative ambitions. Older models (e.g., dual process) attempted to debunk traditional moral theories, whereas newer models (e.g., ADC model) attempt to fit their empirical and normative claims with them. The issue of normative significance as it pertains to the use of social science methodology on moral intuitions remains open. This paper analyzes the Is/Ought gap and the empirical underpinnings of influential constructivist approaches in order to argue that the normative ambitions of empirical neuroethics models are not necessarily always misguided. The author clarifies how legitimate normative implications can be dissociated from overreaches and argues that moral intuitions could be used as the factual basis for ethics by employing the distinction between natural facts, social facts, and social constructs. Ultimately, morality can be fruitfully studied and informed by natural and social sciences and, thorough ethical reflection, ought also to inform empirical research.

经验神经伦理学模型一直都有规范的野心。较旧的模型（例如，双重过程）试图揭穿传统的道德理论，而较新的模型（例如，ADC模型）试图使其符合经验和规范要求。关于在道德直觉上使用社会科学方法的规范意义的问题仍然存在。本文分析了有影响力的建构主义方法的Is / Ought差距和经验基础，以便论证经验神经伦理学模型的规范野心并不一定总是被误导。作者阐明了如何将合法的规范含义与超越范围分离开来，并辩称，道德直觉可以通过利用自然事实，社会事实，和社会建构。最终，可以通过自然科学和社会科学对道德进行富有成果的研究并为之提供信息，并且，在进行充分的伦理思考时，还应该为实证研究提供信息。