ABSTRACT

In the present article, I discuss Husserl’s analysis of the genesis of action in the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins. My aim is to clarify how a “voluntary action” has its genetic phenomenological origin in a “non-voluntary doing”, and, in turn, clarify how this latter activity has its genetic phenomenological origin in a passive “tendency” of the will. In order to achieve this aim, I first present the characterization of voluntary action as a “volitional process”. Then, I delimit the full scope of voluntary actions by analysing Husserl’s descriptions of the different degrees of “voluntariness”. After that, I explicate how voluntary actions phenomenologically originate from non-voluntary doings by examining the “consciousness of the I can”. Finally, I disclose the genetic phenomenological origin of non-voluntary doings by addressing the experience of tendency in the sphere of “passivity of the will”.

摘要

在本文中，我讨论了胡塞尔在胡塞尔版的Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins中对行动起源的分析。. 我的目的是阐明“自愿行为”如何在“非自愿行为”中具有其遗传现象学起源，进而阐明后一种活动如何在意志的被动“倾向”中具有其遗传现象学起源。为了实现这一目标，我首先将自愿行动的特征描述为“意志过程”。然后，通过分析胡塞尔对“自愿性”不同程度的描述，界定了自愿行为的全部范围。之后，我通过考察“我能的意识”来解释自愿行为在现象学上是如何起源于非自愿行为的。最后，我通过解决“意志的被动性”领域的趋势经验来揭示非自愿行为的遗传现象学起源。