ABSTRACT

Using the unique grant level data, this paper shows that government R&D grants to private firms lead to more innovation when independent monitoring (e.g. outside directors) in the grant receiving firms is stronger, but to less innovation when chaebol influence (e.g. affiliated ownership) is stronger. However, the direct effect of independent monitoring on reported innovation is negative, while that of chaebol influence is positive. These results are consistent with the hypotheses that independent monitoring reduces the misuse of grant money; increases the efficiency of managing R&D grants; and reduces the overstatement of grant outcomes, while chaebol influence does the opposite.

摘要

本文使用独特的赠款水平数据表明，当接受赠款公司的独立监督（例如外部董事）较强时，政府对私营公司的研发赠款会导致更多创新，但当财阀影响（例如附属所有权）时，创新较少更强。然而，独立监测对报告创新的直接影响是负面的，而财阀影响的直接影响是积极的。这些结果与独立监督减少滥用赠款的假设一致；提高管理研发拨款的效率；并减少对赠款结果的夸大，而财阀的影响则相反。