ABSTRACT

This research examines three strategies that a multi-product firm can adopt when facing a single-product entrant under Bertrand competition: (i) staying in the duopoly market, (ii) abandoning the duopoly market, and (iii) bundling the two goods. When the competing good is homogenous, bundling is the most profitable strategy if the product differentiation of the two goods produced by the multi-product firm is not too high. When the competing good is heterogeneous, the preferred strategy of the multi-product firm and the welfare ranking depend on the substitutability of the competing good and the degree of product differentiation between the two goods.

摘要

本研究考察了多产品公司在 Bertrand 竞争下面对单一产品进入者时可以采取的三种策略：(i) 留在双头垄断市场，(ii) 放弃双头垄断市场，以及 (iii) 捆绑两种商品。当竞争商品是同质的时，如果多产品公司生产的两种商品的产品差异不是太高，则捆绑销售是最有利可图的策略。当竞争品是异质时，多产品企业的偏好策略和福利排名取决于竞争品的可替代性和两种商品之间的产品差异化程度。