One of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical properties (Seager Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 129–145, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experience of causation (2014, Topoi, 39, 1073–1088, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the dispositionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out to coincide (Philosophical Studies, 175, 1423–1440, 2018: 1438)), and thus contend that Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Russellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.

占据罗素泛心理学家议程最紧迫的挑战之一，是想出一种方法来调和传统论与范畴论的联系（Seager Journal of Consciousness Studies，13（10-11），129-145，2006； Alter和Nagasawa） ，2015年），基于HHMørch从因果经验（2014，Topoi，39、1073-1088、2018、2020）的经验中得出的对性倾向友好的论点-即将成为一个统一的，无所不包的案例。在这方面，莫奇（Mørch）声称，通过对财产认同理论的承诺，人们可以一贯持有两种泛心理学论点而不会产生矛盾（2020：281）—我将这种提议称为和解。。在我的论文中，我将论证事实并非如此。就此而言，我将首先考虑泰勒（H. Taylor）的论点，即认同理论家与处置论者具有完全相同的资源（因为经过仔细的询问，他们对财产的形而上学的观点最终是一致的（哲学研究，175，1423– 1440，2018：1438）），因此认为对帐无法获得。然后，我建议人们可以通过采用另一种形式的强力质量视图（即“复合”视图）来避免该问题并调和论点，从而提出一种新的索赔形式，即“和解” *。最后，尽管追求我提出的解决方案可能使罗素泛精神主义暴露于表观现象主义的风险，但我将得出结论，这种表观现象主义的特定形式是一种相当良性的形式，因此，通过和解*，构成泛精神主义的统一案例为可以实现一个积极的建议（而不仅仅是二元论和物理主义的替代）。