Anchoring is one of the most studied and robust behavioral biases, but there is little knowledge about its persistence in economic strategic interactions. Using experimental auctions, we show that bidding strategies are anchored by irrelevant numbers. The announcement of a random group identification number has a positive effect on bids. We also find a strong effect of a maximal permissible bid, despite being irrelevant for a rational player: In first-price sealed-bid auctions, a higher upper bid limit increases bids, whereas, in Dutch auctions, the effect of the starting price is negative and consistent with a model that takes into account the value of time in auctions. We demonstrate that the long-established ranking that the Dutch auction generates lower revenue than the sealed-bid auction crucially depends on the size of the maximal permissible bid.

锚固是研究最多，最有力的行为偏见之一，但对其在经济战略互动中的持久性知之甚少。通过实验性拍卖，我们显示出出价策略是由无关数字决定的。公布随机的组标识号会对投标产生积极影响。尽管与理性参与者无关，我们也发现了最大允许出价的强烈影响：在第一价格密封竞标拍卖中，较高的出价上限会提高出价，而在荷兰拍卖中，起拍价的影响是否定的，并且与考虑拍卖时间价值的模型一致。