Drawing on the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alberto G. Urquidez works to free the fly (i.e. race/racism) from the metaphorical bottle by shifting the terms of the debate away from attempts at describing a thing that is not real and toward a normative or prescriptive approach to racism, rather than race, that emphasizes how the concept ought to be defined, as well as deployed, for anti-racist ends. Urquidez refers to this normative pragmatic approach as ‘conventionalism’ and the overarching structure of (Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis thus describes this position and then emphasizes its normative force. Here, I unpack Urquidez’s dual critique while also emphasizing my anxieties about a linguistic approach to race or racism, which might be framed as a variation of the is/ought problem insofar as it remains unclear to me how Alberto’s framework accounts for the transition from descriptive critique to normative anti-racist action.

借鉴路德维希·维特根斯坦（Ludwig Wittgenstein）的后期作品，阿尔贝托·G·厄基德斯（Alberto G. Urquidez）通过使辩论的内容从描述非真实事物的尝试转向规范性工作，从而摆脱了隐喻的束缚（种族/种族）或种族主义而不是种族的规定性方法，强调应该为反种族主义目的定义和部署该概念的方式。乌尔基德斯称这种规范性的实用主义方法为“传统主义”和（重新）定义种族主义的总体结构：一种哲学分析。因此描述了这个立场，然后强调了它的规范作用力。在这里，我解开了厄奎德兹的双重批评，同时还强调了我对种族或种族主义的语言学方法的焦虑，在我不清楚阿尔贝托的框架如何解释从描述性过渡的范围内，这可能构成了问题/应该解决的问题。对规范性的反种族主义行动的批评。