Multi-family firms represent an important and complex type of family firm that is not as well understood as single-family firms. We develop a governance-based framework of the agency complexities in multi-family firms, theorizing that divergent family-centered noneconomic goals between the owning families create complex inter-family agency problems that are intensified by evolving family dynamics. We propose governance mechanisms that address these problems by limiting opportunistic behavior associated with the pursuit of noneconomic goals related to firm control, family altruism, social capital, and transgenerational succession. We then present a future research agenda that can expand our knowledge of multi-family firms.

多家族企业代表了一种重要而复杂的家族企业类型，它不如单家族企业那么容易理解。我们针对多家族企业的代理机构复杂性建立了基于治理的框架，并据此推论，拥有家族之间以家庭为中心的非经济目标之间的分歧会导致复杂的家族间代理问题，而这些问题会随着家族动态的发展而加剧。我们提出了通过限制与追求与公司控制，家族利他主义，社会资本和跨代继承有关的非经济目标相关的机会主义行为来解决这些问题的治理机制。然后，我们提出了一个未来的研究议程，可以扩展我们对多家族企业的了解。