Economic agreements concluded between the EU and third parties increasingly take on security matters, such as counter-terrorism, nuclear proliferation and international criminal law. Highlighting the remarkable variation in the presence and content of these security non-trade issues (SNTIs), we argue that it is best explained by the EU's intensity of foreign policy interests vis-à-vis its partners. Specifically, different stakeholders have divergent views on this matter: some advocate strong linkage between trade and security, while others prefer to tackle these issues separately. We expect the former perspective to determine the content of economic agreements when the partner is in the EU's backyard. The latter perspective will dominate in negotiations with more distant partners. We test these expectations with a new data set of SNTIs in EU agreements. Employing quantitative methods and controlling for several alternative explanations, we find ample support for the theoretical framework.

中文翻译：

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主要在其后院：欧盟经济协议中的安全条款

欧盟与第三方达成的经济协议越来越多地涉及安全问题，例如反恐、核扩散和国际刑法。强调这些安全非贸易问题 (SNTI) 的存在和内容的显着差异，我们认为最好通过欧盟对其合作伙伴的外交政策利益强度来解释。具体而言，不同的利益相关者在这个问题上有不同的看法：一些人主张贸易与安全之间有很强的联系，而另一些人则倾向于分别解决这些问题。当合作伙伴在欧盟的后院时，我们预计前一种观点将决定经济协议的内容。后一种观点将在与更远距离的伙伴的谈判中占主导地位。我们使用欧盟协议中 SNTI 的新数据集来测试这些预期。采用定量方法并控制几种替代解释，我们找到了对理论框架的充分支持。