Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of CEO compensation for sample of the US firms. It emphasizes the presence of executive compensation persistence and the importance of CEO power besides performance while setting CEO pay.

Design/methodology/approach

The empirical analysis is conducted on a large sample of US firms during the period 2006–2016. It is based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) models to assess the impact of numerous factors on CEO compensation.

Findings

The main findings reveal that firm performance proxied by accounting-based proxies, as well as market-based proxies, plays a significant role in explaining variations in levels of executive compensation. Moreover, there is a significant persistence in executive compensation among the US sample firms. The authors also document that poor governance conditions (managerial power hypothesis) lead to high compensation levels offered to CEO.

Research limitations/implications

At the end, without a doubt, the analysis has some limitations that prompt the authors to consider future research directions. One future research avenue that can help better explain the effect of firm performance on the CEO compensation is to study this issue using an international sample to determine whether country-level characteristics (e.g. creditor rights, shareholder rights and the enforcement climate) can influence this relationship. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile to deepen the analysis of CEO power and its impact on CEO compensation. It will be interesting to emphasize how the CEO power interacts with the other governance characteristics and some CEO attributes as CEO gender.

Practical implications

The paper's findings have implications for practitioners, policymakers and regulatory authorities. First, the findings inform regulators that performance is not the only determinant of CEO pay level. This may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure. Second, the study offers insights to policymakers and members of boards of directors interested in enhancing the design of executive compensation and internal corporate governance, to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Firms should strengthen the board independence and properly constitute the board committees (compensation, risk, nomination…).

Originality/value

This paper presents a comprehensive overview of the CEO compensation determinants. It supplements the classic pay-for-performance sensitivity predictions with insights gained from the dynamics of wage setting theory and managerial power theory. The authors develop a composite index to measure the CEO power in order to test the impact of CEO attributes on CEO pay. Additionally, it verifies whether the determinants of CEO pay depend on firm age and size.

中文翻译：

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CEO薪酬的决定因素：来自美国的新见解

目的

本文的目的是研究美国公司样本中CEO薪酬的决定因素。它强调了高管薪酬持续性的存在，以及在设定 CEO 薪酬时 CEO 权力除了绩效之外的重要性。

设计/方法/方法

实证分析是在 2006 年至 2016 年期间对大量美国公司样本进行的。它基于广义矩量法 (GMM) 模型来评估众多因素对 CEO 薪酬的影响。

发现

主要发现表明，基于会计的代理以及基于市场的代理所代表的公司绩效在解释高管薪酬水平的变化方面起着重要作用。此外，美国样本公司的高管薪酬存在显着的持续性。作者还记录了不良的治理条件（管理层权力假设）导致提供给 CEO 的高薪酬水平。

研究限制/影响

最后，毫无疑问，分析有一些局限性，促使作者考虑未来的研究方向。未来可以帮助更好地解释公司绩效对 CEO 薪酬影响的一个研究途径是使用国际样本来研究这个问题，以确定国家层面的特征（例如债权人权利、股东权利和执行环境）是否会影响这种关系. 此外，值得深入分析 CEO 权力及其对 CEO 薪酬的影响。强调 CEO 权力如何与其他治理特征和某些 CEO 属性作为 CEO 性别相互作用将很有趣。

实际影响

该论文的发现对从业者、政策制定者和监管机构产生了影响。首先，调查结果告诉监管机构，绩效并不是 CEO 薪酬水平的唯一决定因素。这可能需要更多的公司披露薪酬结构的细节。其次，该研究为有兴趣加强高管薪酬和内部公司治理设计的决策者和董事会成员提供了见解，以更好地使管理激励与股东利益保持一致。公司应加强董事会的独立性，适当组成董事会委员会（薪酬、风险、提名……）。

原创性/价值

本文全面概述了 CEO 薪酬的决定因素。它通过从工资设定理论和管理权力理论的动态中获得的见解补充了经典的绩效薪酬敏感性预测。作者开发了一个综合指数来衡量 CEO 权力，以测试 CEO 属性对 CEO 薪酬的影响。此外，它还验证了 CEO 薪酬的决定因素是否取决于公司的年龄和规模。