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Effects of Bribery on Firms' Environmental Innovation Adoption in Vietnam: Mediating Roles of Firms' Bargaining Power and Credit and Institutional Constraints
Ecological Economics ( IF 7 ) Pub Date : 2021-04-05 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107042
Le Thanh Ha , Pham Xuan Nam , To Trung Thanh

This paper uses survey data of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam, from 2011 to 2015, to examine the effects of bribery on environmental innovation decisions by firms, accounting for the roles of bargaining power and/or credit and institutional constraints. In the study, bribery activities are categorized into greasing and rent-seeking forms. Self-assessment of firms on the uncertainty of government policies and the competition environment is used to capture institutional constraints, while firm size and legal registration status are used to represent bargaining power. The group of credit-constrained firms is further broken down into those that have demand for more loans and those not currently looking for a loan application. Our empirical results provide evidence that greasing bribery has a positive effect on firms' decisions about implementation of environmental innovation (the “greasing-the-wheels” hypothesis) while there is no impact from rent-seeking bribery. The positive effect of greasing bribery is particularly sizable for large, formally registered firms, or those facing no credit constraints, while specific types of institutional constraints that firms perceive as obstacles to their growth also affect the magnitude of the impact. Lastly, when endogeneity is controlled, the effect of greasing bribery becomes more pronounced and there is evidence on the “sanding-the-wheels” hypothesis of rent-seeking bribery.



中文翻译:

贿赂对越南企业采用环境创新的影响:企业议价能力,信用和制度约束的中介作用

本文使用越南中小型企业(SMEs)2011年至2015年的调查数据,研究了贿赂对企业环境创新决策的影响,并说明了议价能力和/或信贷的作用以及制度约束。在研究中,贿赂活动分为加油和寻租两种形式。企业对政府政策和竞争环境不确定性的自我评估被用来捕捉制度约束,而企业规模和合法注册状况则被用来代表议价能力。信用受限企业的类别进一步细分为那些需要更多贷款的企业和那些目前不寻求贷款申请的企业。我们的实证结果提供了证据,证明行贿受贿对企业的 实施环境创新的决策(“推销”假说),而寻租贿赂则没有影响。对于大型,正式注册的公司或没有信用限制的公司而言,增加贿赂的积极效果尤其可观,而公司视为阻碍其增长的障碍的特定类型的制度性约束也影响了影响的程度。最后,当控制了内生性时,增加贿赂的效果变得更加明显,并且有证据表明寻租贿赂的“砂轮式”假设。或那些没有信用约束的公司,而公司认为是阻碍其增长的特定类型的机构约束也影响着这种冲击的程度。最后,当控制内生性时,增加贿赂的效果变得更加明显,并且有证据表明寻租贿赂的“砂光”假说。或那些没有信用约束的公司,而公司认为是阻碍其增长的特定类型的机构约束也影响着这种冲击的程度。最后,当控制内生性时,增加贿赂的效果变得更加明显,并且有证据表明寻租贿赂的“砂光”假说。

更新日期:2021-04-05
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