In ‘God, evil, and occasionalism’ Matthew Shea and C.P. Ragland appeal to the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing to argue against Alvin Plantinga that occasionalism is morally worse than conservationism. In this article I critically examine their argument and conclude that it fails because it contains an equivocation or is unwarranted. I also offer a case against their position by, first, arguing that on none of three prominent accounts of doing and allowing God merely allows suffering.

Second, I develop the ‘Epistemological-Equivalence Argument’ in order to show that even if we grant such a distinction for God's acts, they would be morally on a par.

在“上帝、邪恶和偶然主义”中，马修·谢伊 (Matthew Shea) 和 CP 拉格兰 (CP Ragland) 呼吁做事和允许的学说反对阿尔文·普兰廷加 (Alvin Plantinga)，即偶然主义在道德上比保护主义更糟糕。在这篇文章中，我批判性地研究了他们的论点，并得出结论，它失败了，因为它包含模棱两可或没有根据。我还提出了一个反对他们立场的案例，首先，我认为在三个关于做事和允许上帝的突出记载中，没有一个只是允许受苦。

其次，我提出“认识论-等价论”是为了表明，即使我们对上帝的作为给予这样的区分，它们在道德上也是相提并论的。