(Dellsén, Philosophical Studies, 177(12), 3661–3678, 2020) argues that a positivistic defense of science’s objectivity is incoherent because bias in the generation of scientific theories (implies that the rational evaluation of theories will also be biased. Even though this is an idea easy to agree with, this approach is flawed for two different but related reasons. First, Dellsén’s notion of bias does not account for many ordinary biases. Second, Dellsén’s use of bias at the community-level is inconsistent. It shifts from individual scientists generating new theories and making decisions to scientific communities evaluating and accepting what theories are valid. This article offers a stronger response than Dellsén’s about aseptic objectivity in science by providing a more adequate account of bias, where psychological and behavioral aspects of individual scientists and community-level scientific practices are considered.

（Dellsén，Philosophical Studies，177（12），3661–3678，2020）认为，对科学客观性的实证主义辩护是不一致的，因为科学理论的产生存在偏见（这意味着对理论的合理评价也将产生偏见。这是一个易于接受的想法，这种方法存在两个不同但相关的原因，存在缺陷：第一，Dellsén的偏见没有解决许多常见的偏见；第二，Dellsén在社区一级使用偏见是不一致的。它从产生新理论和做出决策的单个科学家转变为评估和接受哪些理论有效的科学界。本文提供了更充分的偏见，在考虑个体科学家的心理和行为方面以及社区层面的科学实践方面，本文提供了比Dellsen对科学中的无菌客观性更强的回应。