In this paper, a blockchain-enabled Stackelberg game model is proposed for the Quality-of-Service Optimized Link State Routing (QoS-OLSR) protocol in urban VANET. While QoS-OLSR protocols introduce game models, Stackelberg in specific, to select stable relays, the information exchanged by nodes and the selection process cannot be trusted. The introduction of Blockchain to VANET arose as a means for adding trust. However, existing works integrating blockchain do not fully exploit its capabilities in hosting verified reputations, selecting relays, or sharing monetary incentives to motivate cooperation of relays. Therefore, the proposed Stackelberg game model integrates off-chain QoS-OLSR protocol and designed on-chain smart contracts, which consists of two managers: Node Reputation Manager (NRM) and Relay Selection Game Manager (RSGM) to select relays. The proposed game model has three stages: 1) the role identification, 2) the off-chain follower incentive selection, and 3) the on-chain leader profit maximization. The first stage is for nodes identify their role in the game model; leader or follower. Then, the second stage allows followers (nodes) to calculate incentives for leaders (relays) based on off-chain exchanged QoS-OLSR messages including QoS and reputation. NRM allows verifying the reputations within the messages of nodes. The calculated incentives are deposited to RSGM as followers’ strategies. The third stage, executed on-chain in RSGM, generates the set of accepted followers for a leader reliably and forwards the deposited incentives to leaders. Simulations were conducted to demonstrate that the proposed game model outperforms in terms of leaders’ utility and followers’ payments while keeping the percentage of relays constant compared to the benchmark model. Furthermore, cost analysis confirms the feasibility and cost-efficiency of such a model.

本文针对城市VANET中的服务质量优化链路状态路由（QoS-OLSR）协议，提出了启用区块链的Stackelberg游戏模型。尽管QoS-OLSR协议引入了游戏模型（特别是Stackelberg）来选择稳定的中继，但节点之间交换的信息和选择过程的信息不可信。将区块链引入VANET是增加信任的一种手段。但是，集成区块链的现有作品并未充分利用其在托管经过验证的声誉，选择中继器或共享金钱激励来激励中继器合作方面的能力。因此，提出的Stackelberg游戏模型集成了链下QoS-OLSR协议并设计了链上智能合约，该合约由两个管理器组成：节点信誉管理器（NRM）和中继选择游戏管理器（RSGM）来选择中继。所提出的博弈模型分为三个阶段：1）角色识别； 2）链下跟随者激励选择； 3）链上领导者利润最大化。第一个阶段是让节点确定其在游戏模型中的角色；领导者或追随者。然后，第二阶段允许跟随者（节点）基于链下交换的QoS-OLSR消息计算对领导者（中继）的激励，包括QoS和信誉。NRM允许验证节点消息中的信誉。计算出的激励措施将作为跟随者的策略存入RSGM。第三阶段在RSGM中按链执行，可可靠地为领导者生成一组已接受的关注者，并将存入的激励转发给领导者。仿真表明，所提出的博弈模型在领导者的效用和追随者的报酬方面表现优于同类模型，同时与基准模型相比，中继率保持不变。此外，成本分析证实了这种模型的可行性和成本效率。