A growing number of studies explore the determinants of economic freedom. Very few of them consider constitutional design. We study entrenchment, that is, the extent to which constitutions are more costly to change than ordinary policies and institutions. We utilize 1970–2017 data and study episodes where countries adopted meaningfully more entrenched constitutions. Using matching methods, we construct plausible counterfactuals against which to compare their post-treatment changes in economic freedom. We report no significant effects on overall freedom. There is some evidence that entrenchment leads to smaller government size, more regulation, and weaker property rights. However, none of these results are robust.

中文翻译：

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宪法保护对经济自由重要吗？

越来越多的研究探讨了经济自由的决定因素。他们中很少有人考虑宪法设计。我们研究巩固，即宪法比普通政策和制度的改变成本更高的程度。我们利用 1970 年至 2017 年的数据和研究事件，在这些事件中，各国采用了更有意义的更根深蒂固的宪法。使用匹配方法，我们构建了合理的反事实，以比较它们在经济自由方面的处理后变化。我们报告对整体自由度没有显着影响。有一些证据表明，巩固会导致政府规模变小、监管更多、产权变弱。然而，这些结果都不是稳健的。