Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that the responsibility of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc. (TEPCO) was “economized” in the wake of the accident. It is argued that responsibility for the nuclear accident was mainly linked to economic responsibility, and that social and moral responsibility were consequently obscured by the financial accounting that followed the accident. This paper also proposes that the responsibility for the accident should not be limited to TEPCO, but that the responsibility of the nuclear industry and regulatory bodies should be more strongly emphasized in order to prevent such accidents in the future. These conclusions are consistent with some of the literature that emerged following the Fukushima accident. The theoretical framework is derived from sociological studies on quantification and accounting literature on economizing. TEPCO’s accounts, the special business plans of TEPCO and the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation, and documentation from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry are the main sources that are consulted in this paper.

摘要

本文的目的是表明东京电力公司控股公司 (TEPCO) 的责任在事故发生后“节省”了。有人认为，核事故的责任主要与经济责任有关，因此，事故发生后的财务会计掩盖了社会和道德责任。本文还提出，事故的责任不应仅限于东电，而应更加强调核工业和监管机构的责任，以防止今后发生此类事故。这些结论与福岛事故后出现的一些文献一致。理论框架源自关于量化的社会学研究和关于节约的会计文献。东京电力公司的账目、东京电力公司和核损害赔偿和退役便利化公司的特别业务计划以及来自经济、贸易和工业部的文件是本文参考的主要来源。