Social care services are increasingly provisioned in quasi-markets in which for-profit, public, and third sector providers compete for contracts. Existing research has investigated the implications of this development by analyzing ownership variation in latent outcomes such as quality, but little is known about whether ownership predicts variation in more concrete outcomes, such as violation types. To address this research gap, we coded publicly available inspection reports of social care providers regulated by the Care Inspectorate in Scotland and created a novel data set enabling analysis of ownership variation in violations of (a) regulations, and (b) national care standards over an entire inspection year (n = 4,178). Using negative binomial and logistic regression models, we find that for-profit providers are more likely to violate non-enforceable outcomes (national care standards) relative to other ownership types. We did not identify a statistically significant difference between for-profit and third sector providers with regard to enforceable outcomes (regulations).

准市场中越来越多地提供社会护理服务，在这些市场中，营利性，公共和第三部门提供者竞争合同。现有研究已经通过分析诸如质量之类的潜在结果中所有权的变化来调查这种发展的含义，但对于所有权是否能预测更具体的结果（例如违规类型）的变化知之甚少。为了解决这一研究差距，我们对由苏格兰护理检查局监管的社会护理提供者的公开检查报告进行了编码，并创建了一个新颖的数据集，可以分析违反（a）法规和（b）国家护理标准的所有权变化整个检查年（n= 4,178）。使用负二项式和逻辑回归模型，我们发现与其他所有权类型相比，营利性提供者更可能违反不可执行的结果（国家医疗保健标准）。我们没有发现营利性组织和第三部门提供者在可强制执行的结果（法规）方面在统计上有显着差异。