Central bank communication about financial stability causally affects individuals’ beliefs and risk-taking behavior, consistent with an expectations channel of financial stability communication. Individuals receiving a warning from the central bank in a randomized information experiment expect a higher probability of a financial crisis and reduce their demand for risky assets. This reduction is driven by downward revisions in individuals’ expected Sharpe ratios due to lower expected returns and higher perceived downside risks. In addition, these individuals deposit a smaller fraction of their savings at riskier banks.

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有爪子的无牙老虎？金融稳定沟通、预期和风险承担

中央银行关于金融稳定的沟通会因果地影响个人的信念和冒险行为，与金融稳定沟通的预期渠道一致。在随机信息实验中收到中央银行警告的个人预计发生金融危机的可能性更高，并减少对风险资产的需求。由于较低的预期回报和较高的预期下行风险，个人预期夏普比率下调所致。此外，这些人将一小部分储蓄存入风险较高的银行。