Do wage-setting institutions, such as collective bargaining, improve health and, if so, is this because they reduce income inequality? Wage-setting institutions are often assumed to improve health because they increase earnings and reduce inequality and yet, while individual-level studies suggest higher earnings improve well being, the direct effects of these institutions on mortality remains unclear. This paper explores both the relationship between wage-setting institutions and mortality rates whether income inequality mediates this relationship. Using 50 years of data from 22 high-income countries (n ~ 825), I find mortality rates are lower in countries with collective bargaining compared to places with little or no wage protection. While wage-setting institutions may reduce economic inequality, these institutions do not appear to improve health because they reduce inequality. Instead, collective bargaining improves health, in part, because they increase average wage growth. The political and economic drivers of inequality may not, then, be correlated with health outcomes, and, as a result, health scholars need to develop more nuanced theories of the political economy of health that are separate from but in dialogue with the political economy of inequality.

中文翻译：

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工资设定制度对健康的影响：集体谈判如何改善健康，但不是因为它减少了不平等

集体谈判等工资设定制度是否能改善健康，如果是，是否因为它们减少了收入不平等？工资设定机构通常被认为可以改善健康，因为它们可以增加收入并减少不平等，然而，虽然个人层面的研究表明更高的收入可以改善福祉，但这些机构对死亡率的直接影响仍不清楚。本文探讨了工资设定制度与死亡率之间的关系，是否收入不平等会调节这种关系。使用来自 22 个高收入国家的 50 年数据 ( n ~ 825），我发现与工资保护很少或没有工资保护的地方相比，有集体谈判的国家的死亡率较低。虽然工资制定机构可能会减少经济不平等，但这些机构似乎并没有改善健康，因为它们减少了不平等。相反，集体谈判改善了健康，部分原因是它们提高了平均工资增长。因此，不平等的政治和经济驱动因素可能与健康结果无关，因此，健康学者需要发展更细致的健康政治经济学理论，这些理论与健康的政治经济学分离但与之对话。不等式。