Recently, many European local authorities have set up Urban Consolidation Centres (UCC) for dealing with challenges arising from the environmental and social impacts of logistical activities in urban contexts through shipment synchronisation and carrier coordination policies. However, the number of successful UCC projects led by local authorities in Europe is low, with most of the UCCs failing to achieve financial sustainability after the initial experimental phase, which is often heavily supported by public funds. In order to propose mechanisms that could favour the economic and financial sustainability of UCC systems, this research develops an adaptation of game-theoretic approaches to the problems of responsibility and cost allocation among stakeholders participating in a UCC delivery network. A solution based on the Shapley Value concept is employed to derive cost allocations; applications of the model to a real-world scenario are evaluated. An extensive sensitivity analysis shows that the proposed cost allocation rules can provide alternative arrangements, based on extended responsibility concepts, which can alleviate the burden on local authorities for the set up of UCCs. As such, results provide useful policy and practice implications on how to safeguard UCCs’ viability under different scenarios, including the outsourcing of the last-mile deliveries.

最近，许多欧洲地方当局已经建立了城市整合中心（UCC），以通过货运同步和承运人协调政策来应对物流活动在城市环境中对环境和社会的影响所带来的挑战。但是，由欧洲地方当局领导的成功的UCC项目数量很少，大多数UCC在最初的试验阶段后都无法实现财务可持续性，而这通常受到公共资金的大力支持。为了提出有利于UCC系统的经济和金融可持续性的机制，本研究针对参与UCC交付网络的利益相关者之间的责任和成本分配问题开发了一种博弈论方法。采用基于Shapley值概念的解决方案来推导成本分配。评估模型在实际场景中的应用。广泛的敏感性分析表明，根据以下内容，建议的成本分配规则可以提供其他安排：扩展了责任概念，可以减轻地方当局建立UCC的负担。因此，结果为如何在不同情况下（包括最后一英里交付的外包）维护UCC的生存能力提供了有用的政策和实践意义。