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Do Majority-of-Minority Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions
Journal of Accounting Research ( IF 4.446 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-30 , DOI: 10.1111/1475-679x.12357
NAN LI 1
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In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a majority-of-minority shareholder voting mechanism helps mitigate expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions. A difference-in-differences analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume. I also find that stock markets react positively to the voting rule's passage, and that the rule makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.

中文翻译:

少数股东的多数投票权会减少征用吗?关联交易证据

在企业集团存在的情况下,通过关联方交易 (RPT) 进行的征用对小股东来说很常见且成本高昂。使用印度 RPT 投票规则的设置,我发现多数少数股东投票机制有助于减轻征用。少数股东积极表达反对 RPT 决议的声音。差异分析表明,股东投票对 RPT 数量具有显着的威慑作用。我还发现股票市场对投票规则的通过反应积极,而且该规则使印度公司对外国机构投资者更具吸引力。
更新日期:2021-03-30
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