ABSTRACT

This essay is an investigation into the sense of ‘able’ relevant to free will, where free will is understood as requiring the ability to do otherwise. I argue that van Inwagen's recent functional specification of the relevant sense of ‘able’ is flawed, and that explicating the powers involved in free will shall likely require paying detailed attention to the semantics and pragmatics of ‘can’ and ‘able’. Further, I argue that van Inwagen's promise-level ability requirement on free will is too strong. I also argue that Mele's conjecture that the strength of the ability to perform the ‘alternative’ action (i.e. to refrain, to decide otherwise) be no higher than the strength of the ability exercised in performing an action is mistaken. I suggest there is an asymmetry in the strengths of the abilities which make up the n-way power that comprises free will, and that this looks to have some interesting consequences for the connection between the abilities required for free will and, e.g. the ‘up to us’ locution.

摘要

这篇文章是对与自由意志相关的“能力”意义的调查，其中自由意志被理解为要求有能力做其他事情。我认为 van Inwagen 最近对“能”的相关意义的功能规范是有缺陷的，解释自由意志所涉及的权力可能需要详细注意“能”和“能”的语义和语用学。此外，我认为范因瓦根对自由意志的承诺级别能力要求太强了。我还争辩说，Mele 的猜想，即执行“替代”行动（即克制、做出其他决定）的能力强度不高于在执行某项动作时所运用的能力强度是错误的。我认为构成自由意志的 n 向力量的能力强度存在不对称性，这看起来对自由意志所需的能力之间的联系产生了一些有趣的后果，例如对我们来说。