ABSTRACT

The Frankfurt-style Counterexamples (FSCs) to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) have been controversial. I sketch some of the major moves in the debates surrounding the FSCs, and I seek to provide an answer to a big challenge: the indeterministic horn of the ‘dilemma defense’. (Elsewhere I have addressed the deterministic horn.) Given indeterminism (at the relevant places), it is unclear how Black (the counterfactual intervener) can know with certainty what Jones will choose and do in the future; this leaves at least some open alternatives for Jones. I adopt the strategy of positing God in Black’s place (following others, such as David Hunt). The challenge now is to explain how God can have knowledge with certainty of future free human behavior in an indeterministic context, insofar as there is no entailing evidence in available in advance in such a situation. I present the Bootstrapping View of God’s knowledge to solve this problem. If we replace Black with God, we have an indeterministic case in which an agent acts freely, and yet cannot do otherwise. My account of God’s knowledge provides an interpretation of Luis de Molina’s notoriously obscure notion of Supercomprehension.

摘要

替代可能性原则 (PAP) 的法兰克福式反例 (FSC) 一直存在争议。我概述了围绕 FSC 的辩论中的一些主要举措，并试图为一个重大挑战提供答案：“困境防御”的不确定性角。（在其他地方，我已经提到了确定性的号角。）鉴于不确定性（在相关地方），布莱克（反事实干预者）如何确定琼斯未来会选择和做什么还不清楚。这至少为琼斯留下了一些开放的选择。我采用将上帝置于布莱克位置的策略（跟随其他人，例如大卫亨特）。现在的挑战是解释上帝如何在不确定的背景下对未来的自由人类行为有把握的了解，只要在这种情况下没有事先可用的证据。我提出了上帝知识的引导视图来解决这个问题。如果我们用上帝代替布莱克，我们就会遇到一个不确定的情况，在这种情况下，代理人可以自由行动，但又不能做其他事情。我对上帝的知识的描述提供了对路易斯·德·莫利纳（Luis de Molina）臭名昭著的超理解概念的解释。