Courts around the world today are empowered to strike down unconstitutional constitutional amendments. But can a court strike down amendments that restore parts of the original constitution? The Appellate Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court did precisely this in Bangladesh v. Asaduzzaman Siddiqui (2017), holding unconstitutional an amendment that restored the judicial removal provision that existed in the original 1972 Constitution. This article analyzes Siddiqui within the comparative constitutional amendment literature and the broader South Asian context. Despite the apparent incongruity of applying the basic structure doctrine to an original constitutional provision, we argue that Siddiqui is defensible on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. The amendment that was invalidated in this case represented an unconstitutional departure from the judicial removal practice that had existed for several decades and was entrenched by a previous amendment, which “dismembered” the original constitution and safeguarded constitutional democracy in Bangladesh. At a regional level, Siddiqui is similar to recent judgments in India and Pakistan in which apex courts assert their control and limit political influence in judicial appointment and removal proceedings. Such judicial self-dealing, we argue, is more justified in Bangladesh and Pakistan than in India due to their checkered histories with democracy and political interference with judicial functions.

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南亚的司法自我交易和违宪修宪

当今世界各地的法院都有权推翻违宪的宪法修正案。但是法院可以否决恢复部分原宪法的修正案？孟加拉最高法院上诉庭在孟加拉诉 Asaduzzaman Siddiqui (2017) 案中正是这样做的，认为恢复原 1972 年宪法中的司法免职条款的修正案违宪。本文在比较宪法修正案文献和更广泛的南亚背景下分析了西迪基。尽管将基本结构学说应用于最初的宪法条款显然不一致，但我们认为西迪基在理论和实用方面都是站得住脚的。在本案中被宣告无效的修正案违反了宪法，背离了已经存在了几十年的司法驱逐做法，并且被先前的一项修正案根深蒂固，该修正案“肢解”了原始宪法，维护了孟加拉国的宪政民主。在地区层面，西迪基类似于印度和巴基斯坦最近的判决，在这些判决中，最高法院在司法任免程序中行使控制权并限制政治影响力。我们认为，这种司法自我交易在孟加拉国和巴基斯坦比在印度更合理，因为它们在民主和政治干预司法职能方面的历史曲折。它“肢解”了原始宪法，维护了孟加拉国的宪政民主。在地区层面，西迪基类似于印度和巴基斯坦最近的判决，在这些判决中，最高法院在司法任免程序中行使控制权并限制政治影响力。我们认为，这种司法自我交易在孟加拉国和巴基斯坦比在印度更合理，因为它们在民主和政治干预司法职能方面的历史曲折。它“肢解”了原始宪法，维护了孟加拉国的宪政民主。在地区层面，西迪基类似于印度和巴基斯坦最近的判决，在这些判决中，最高法院在司法任免程序中行使控制权并限制政治影响力。我们认为，这种司法自我交易在孟加拉国和巴基斯坦比在印度更合理，因为它们在民主和政治干预司法职能方面的历史曲折。