What is the relationship between perception and mental imagery? I aim to eliminate an answer that I call perceptualism about mental imagery. Strong perceptualism, defended by Bence Nanay, predictive processing theorists, and several others, claims that imagery is a kind of perceptual state. Weak perceptualism, defended by M. G. F. Martin and Matthew Soteriou, claims that mental imagery is a representation of a perceptual state, a view sometimes called The Dependency Thesis. Strong perceptualism is to be rejected since it misclassifies imagery disorders and abnormalities as perceptual disorders and abnormalities. Weak Perceptualism is to be rejected since it gets wrong the aim and accuracy conditions of a whole class of mental imagery–projected mental imagery–and relies on an impoverished concept of perceptual states, ignoring certain of their structural features. Whatever the relationship between perception and imagery, the perceptualist has it wrong.

知觉与心理意象之间有什么关系？我的目的是消除所谓的关于心理意象的知觉主义答案。由本斯·纳奈（Bence Nanay），预测处理理论家和其他一些人辩护的强烈感知论断言，图像是一种感知状态。由MGF Martin和Matthew Soteriou辩护的弱知觉论认为，心理意象是一种知觉状态的表示，这种观点有时称为“依赖论”。强烈的感知主义将被拒绝，因为它将影像障碍和异常错误地归类为感知障碍和异常。弱感知力是可以被拒绝的，因为它错了整个类别的心理意象（投射的心理意象）的目标和准确性条件，并且依赖于贫困的知觉状态概念，忽略它们的某些结构特征。无论感知与图像之间的关系如何，感知主义者都错了。