ABSTRACT

This article provides a new perspective on the logic of violence of the JNIM in the context of the Malian civil war. After a critical review of the literature on the Malian conflict, this article will apply Benjamin Lessing’s model on the logic of violence in criminal wars to JNIM. Through the adoption of Lessing’s model, this article will demonstrate how JNIM’s insurgency can be considered as a case of violent corruption in the context of a war of constraint. Combining qualitative and quantitative methods, this paper will show firstly, how the Malian civil war should be conceived as a war of constraint rather than a war of conquest; secondly, how JNIM is using violence in order to restrict the implementation of the rule of law in some regions which are strategic also for its financing activities. By adopting this new framework, it will be possible to overcome some conundrums characterising the debate on the Malian insurgency and to highlight some relevant topics for future research.

摘要

本文提供了关于马里内战背景下的JNIM暴力逻辑的新观点。在对有关马里冲突的文献进行严格审查之后，本文将本杰明·莱辛（Benjamin Lessing）关于刑事战争中的暴力逻辑的模型应用于JNIM。通过采用莱辛的模型，本文将演示如何在约束战争的背景下将JNIM的叛乱视为暴力腐败的案例。结合定性和定量方法，本文将首先展示如何将马里内战视为束缚之战而不是征服之战。其次，JNIM如何利用暴力来限制某些在其筹资活动中也具有战略意义的地区的法治实施。通过采用这个新框架，