ABSTRACT

Long regarded by students of comparative politics as an important if muddled concept, oligarchy, as I define it, denotes modes of rule in which public office holders govern with a view to the private interests of the wealthy. The enabling condition in a democratic regime is weak institutional mechanisms of citizen representation and participation. The persistence of oligarchic modes of rule under democracy helps account for the enduring appeal of populism in Latin America. This article outlines the classical theory of oligarchy, examines the use of the concept in contemporary theories of comparative politics, describes oligarchic modes of rule in Latin America’s hierarchical market economies, offers an account of the dynamics of populist mobilisation and oligarchic modes of rule in Peru, and draws lessons from the Odebrecht corruption scandal.

摘要

正如我所定义的那样，寡头政治长期以来被比较政治学的学生们视为一个重要的概念，如果混淆不清，它就是一种统治模式，在这种模式下，公职人员为了富裕者的私人利益而进行统治。民主政权的有利条件是公民代表权和参与权的体制机制薄弱。民主制下寡头统治模式的持续存在，有助于解释拉丁美洲民粹主义的持久吸引力。本文概述了寡头政治的经典理论，考察了该概念在当代比较政治理论中的使用，描述了拉丁美洲等级市场经济中的寡头统治模式，提供了秘鲁民粹主义动员和寡头统治模式的动态，并从奥德布雷希特（Odebrecht）腐败丑闻中汲取了教训。