Capital controls segment the offshore credit market of Chinese renminbi from the onshore market. Using a novel administrative data set, we provide evidence that firms arbitrage the onshore-offshore interest differentials using bank-intermediated “entrepôt trades,” which supposedly re-export imports with little or no processing. Onshore-offshore interest differentials drive renminbi inflows from entrepôt trades, which strongly predict 1-year-forward outflows to settle bank-issued letters of credit. The patterns and timing of entrepôt trade flows are consistent with lending by onshore banks and borrowing from offshore banks through bank-intermediated trade finance. A larger interest differential allows transactions with a lower value to be profitable and induces entry into arbitrages. Our findings suggest that renminbi interest arbitrages are feasible but costly under capital controls.

资本管制将人民币的离岸信贷市场与在岸市场分开。使用新颖的行政数据集，我们提供的证据表明，企业使用银行干预的“企业交易”套利了岸上-离岸的利差，据称这种出口很少或没有加工就可以转口进口。陆上-离岸利率差异推动了Entrepôt交易的人民币流入，该交易强烈预测一年期前的流出将结清银行发行的信用证。实体贸易流动的方式和时机与境内银行的放款和通过银行中介的贸易融资向境外银行的借贷保持一致。较大的利差使价值较低的交易有利可图，并引发套利交易。