How decision makers respond to behavioral and traditional interventions might depend on their and the regulator's attributes. This online experiment investigates the effect of defaults, recommendations, and mandatory minimum contributions accompanied by regulator information on the private provision of climate protection, accounting for intrinsic motivation. Findings show that all interventions increase the propensity of individuals to choose the focal value. There is no evidence that recommendations and defaults change average contributions. We report a negative interaction of the default with intrinsic motivation. Expert or political regulator information decreases intervention effectiveness. The study improves our understanding of behavioral public policy instruments.

中文翻译：

---

指向、推动或推动私人提供公共物品？

决策者对行为干预和传统干预的反应可能取决于他们和监管者的属性。这项在线实验调查了违约，建议和强制性最低供款的影响，以及监管机构提供的关于私人提供气候保护措施的信息，这些都是内在动机。结果表明，所有干预措施都会增加个人选择焦点值的倾向。没有证据表明建议和默认值会改变平均贡献。我们报告了默认与内在动机的负面相互作用。专家或政治监管者信息会降低干预有效性。该研究提高了我们对行为公共政策工具的理解。