Richard Rowland has recently argued that considerations based on moral disagreement between epistemic peers give us reason to think that cognitivism about moral judgments, i.e., the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, is false. The novelty of Rowland’s argument is to tweak the problem descriptively, i.e., not focusing on what one ought to do, but on what disputants actually do in the light of peer disagreement. The basic idea is that moral peer disagreement is intelligible. However, if moral judgments were beliefs, and beliefs track perceived evidence, then moral peer disagreement would not be intelligible. Hence, moral judgments are not beliefs. The argument is both novel and interesting, but this paper argues that it fails to establish the conclusion. Beliefs are plausibly analyzed as constituted by dispositions to respond to what is perceived as evidence, but dispositions can always be interfered with. Provided a background explanation of why the disposition is not manifested, peer intransigence is quite intelligible.

理查德·罗兰德（Richard Rowland）最近认为，基于认知同伴之间的道德分歧的考虑使我们有理由认为，关于道德判断的认知主义，即道德判断是信仰的论点是错误的。罗兰（Rowland）论点的新颖性在于描述性地调整问题，即，不专注于应该做的事情，而是着眼于实际的争议者根据同伴的不同意见来做。基本思想是道德同伴之间的分歧是可以理解的。但是，如果道德判断是信念，并且信念跟踪感知到的证据，那么道德同伴的分歧就无法理解。因此，道德判断不是信仰。该论点既新颖又有趣，但是本文认为它不能建立结论。信念被合理地分析为由性格构成，以回应被认为是证据的事物，但是性格总是可以被干扰的。对为什么不表现出这种倾向，同伴的不妥协提供了背景知识，这是很容易理解的。