This paper examines the impact of staggered boards on the value of voting rights (i.e., the voting premium) estimated using option prices. We find companies with staggered boards have a higher voting premium. Exploiting plausibly exogenous court rulings, we confirm that weakening the effectiveness of staggered boards decreases the voting premium. Given that the voting premium reflects private benefits consumption and associated managerial inefficiencies, our findings are consistent with the entrenchment view of staggered boards. Analyzing the cross-sectional heterogeneity in our sample, we find the entrenchment effect of staggered boards to be particularly pronounced for firms in noncompetitive industries and for mature firms. (JEL G13, G30, G34, K22)

中文翻译：

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交错董事会和投票权的价值

本文研究了交错董事会对使用期权价格估计的投票权价值（即投票权溢价）的影响。我们发现交错董事会的公司拥有更高的投票权溢价。利用看似合理的外生法院裁决，我们确认削弱交错董事会的有效性会降低投票溢价。鉴于投票溢价反映了私人福利消耗和相关的管理效率低下，我们的研究结果与交错董事会的巩固观点一致。分析我们样本中的横截面异质性，我们发现交错董事会的巩固效应对于非竞争行业的公司和成熟公司来说尤其明显。(JEL G13, G30, G34, K22)