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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity
Mind Pub Date : 2019-11-12 , DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzz056
Juan S Piñeros Glasscock 1
Affiliation  

Many philosophers hold that if an agent acts intentionally, she must know what she is doing. Although the scholarly consensus for many years was to reject the thesis in light of presumed counterexamples by Donald Davidson, several scholars have recently argued that attention to aspectual distinctions and the practical nature of this knowledge shows that these counterexamples fail. In this paper I defend a new objection against the thesis, one modelled after Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. Since this argument relies on general principles about the nature of knowledge rather than on intuitions about fringe cases, the recent responses that have been given to defuse the force of Davidson’s objection are silent against it. Moreover, the argument suggests that even weaker theses connecting practical entities (e.g. basic actions, intentions, attempts, etc.) with knowledge are also false. Recent defenders of the thesis that there is a necessary connection between knowledge and intentional action are motivated by the insight that this connection is non-accidental. I close with a positive proposal to account for the non-accidentality of this link without appeal to necessary connections by drawing an extended analogy between practical and perceptual knowledge.

中文翻译:

实践知识和光度

许多哲学家认为,如果一个代理人故意行事,那么她必须知道自己在做什么。尽管多年来学者的共识是根据唐纳德·戴维森(Donald Davidson)假定的反例来驳斥该论点,但最近有几位学者认为对方面差异的关注和这种知识的实用性表明这些反例是失败的。在本文中,我为反对该论点的新观点辩护,该论点以蒂莫西·威廉姆森(Timothy Williamson)的反发光论证为蓝本。由于该论点是基于关于知识性质的一般原则,而不是基于对附带案例的直觉,因此,最近为缓解戴维森反对意见的力量而做出的回应并未对此表示沉默。此外,该论点表明,将实际实体(例如基本动作,具有知识的意图,尝试等)也是错误的。认识到知识与故意行为之间存在必然联系的新近捍卫者,是因为这种联系不是偶然的。最后,我提出一个积极的建议,即通过在实践知识和感性知识之间进行扩展的类比来说明这种链接的不偶然性,而不诉诸必要的联系。
更新日期:2019-11-12
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