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Tournament incentives and performance: Evidence from the WNBA
Contemporary Economic Policy ( IF 1.212 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-20 , DOI: 10.1111/coep.12530
Brian Hill 1
Affiliation  

Players entering the Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) are allocated to teams based on a draft where lower performing teams in the regular season earn the highest odds of selecting the best players, creating an incentive for teams to lose games. Using data from the 2000–2019 seasons, results indicate that WNBA teams are more likely to lose after they have been eliminated from postseason playoffs regardless of the gender of the coach or general manager. Evidence of tanking is concentrated in seasons after the WNBA made a draft lottery change in 2015, which was intended to reduce tanking.

中文翻译:

锦标赛激励和表现:来自 WNBA 的证据

进入女子国家篮球协会 (WNBA) 的球员根据选秀被分配到球队,其中常规赛中表现较差的球队最有可能选择最佳球员,从而鼓励球队输掉比赛。使用 2000-2019 赛季的数据,结果表明,无论教练或总经理的性别如何,WNBA 球队在季后赛被淘汰后更有可能输球。在 WNBA 于 2015 年对选秀抽签进行更改后,坦克的证据集中在赛季中,旨在减少坦克。
更新日期:2021-03-20
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